Take Bulletin: Q1 2025

Take Bulletin: Q1 2025

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This Bulletin includes coordinated influence operation campaigns that were completed on our platforms in Q1 2025. It was last updated on May 15, 2025.

January

  • We completed 12 YouTube channels and blocked 1 domain from eligibility to appear on Google News Surfaces and discover as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Russia. The campaign shared content in German and English that supported Russia.
  • We completed 81 YouTube channels as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Russia. The campaign shared content in Russian that supported Russia and critically to Ukraine.
  • We blocked 57 domains from eligibility to appear on Google News Surfaces and discover as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Russia. The campaign was linked to the actor publicly tracked as Portal Kombat and shared content in English, French, German, Russian and other languages ​​that supported Russia and critically to Ukraine.
  • We blocked 8 domains from eligibility to appear on Google News Surfaces and discover as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Russia. The campaign shared content in several European languages ​​and Japanese about Russian history, travel and culture.
  • We completed 4 YouTube channels as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Russia. The campaign was linked to Russian state -sponsored units and shared content in Russian who supported Russia and critically to Ukraine.
  • We completed 1,263 YouTube channels as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Russia. The campaign was linked to a Russian consulting firm and shared content in Russian that supported Russia and critically to Ukraine and the West.
  • We blocked 21 domains from the eligibility to appear on Google News Surfaces and discover as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with a US-based consulting firm. The campaign shared content in English on local issues in different regions of the US as well as content related to international business.
  • We completed 1 ad account as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with a Romania-based actor. The campaign shared content in Romanian about the Romanian government and politics.
  • We completed 31 YouTube channels as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Nigeria. The campaign shared content in English that supported Russia and critically to Ukraine and the West.
  • We blocked 1 domain from eligibility to appear on Google News Surfaces and discover as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Israel. The campaign shared content in Arabic about Lebanon. We received prospects from Meta that supported us in this study.
  • We completed 20 YouTube channels and 1 ad account and blocked 6 domains from eligibility to appear on Google News Surfaces and discover as part of our study of coordinated influence operations related to Iran. The campaign shared content in Arabic, Farsi, Hindi and Urdu, who supported Palestine and the Iranian government and critical of Israel and the United States.
  • We completed 1,562 YouTube channels as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Azerbaijan. The campaign shared content in Azerbaijanic, which supported Azerbaijan and critical of Armenia and critics of the Azerbaijan Government.
  • We blocked 25 domains from eligibility to appear on Google News Surfaces and discover as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The campaign was linked to Shanghai Haixun Technology Co., LTD and shared content in Chinese, English, French, German and Italian, spammy and repeated and covered topics supporting the Chinese government.
  • We completed 11,697 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing study of coordinated influence operations associated with China. The coordinated Inauthentic network uploaded content in Chinese and English about China and US foreign affairs. These findings are in line with our previous reports.

February

  • We blocked 72 domains from eligibility to appear on Google News Surfaces and discover as part of our study of coordinated influence operations. The campaign shared content in German about politics in Germany, Europe and the US as well as content support for Russia and critical of Ukraine.
  • We completed 13 YouTube channels as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Russia. The campaign shared content in Russian that supported Russia and critically to Ukraine and the West.
  • We blocked 47 domains from eligibility to appear on Google News Surfaces and discover as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Russia. The campaign was linked to the actress publicly tracked as a doppelder and shared content in Arabic, English, French, German, Hebrew, Italian, Polish and Ukrainian, who supported Russia and critically to Ukraine and the West.
  • We completed 1 YouTube channel as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Russia. The campaign shared content in German supporting Russia.
  • We completed 13 YouTube channels as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Russia. The campaign shared content in German supporting Russia.
  • We blocked 177 domains from the eligibility to appear on Google News Surfaces and discover as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Russia. The campaign was linked to the actor publicly tracked as Portal Kombat and shared content in English, French, German, Russian, Ukrainian and other languages ​​that supported Russia and critical of Ukraine and the West.
  • We completed 32 YouTube channels as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Russia. The campaign shared content in English, French, German, Polish, Turkish and Ukrainian, who supported Russia and critically to Ukraine.
  • We completed 2 YouTube channels as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Russia. The campaign was linked to Russian state -sponsored units and shared content in Russian who supported Russia and critically to Ukraine.
  • We completed 1,482 YouTube channels as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Russia. The campaign was linked to a Russian consulting firm and shared content in Russian that supported Russia and critically to Ukraine and the West.
  • We completed 3 YouTube channels, 1 ad account and 1 AdSense account and blocked 1 domain from eligibility to appear on Google News Surfaces and discover as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with a Germany-based actor. The campaign shared content in German and English related to the German election.
  • We blocked 1 domain from eligibility to appear on Google News Surfaces and discover as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with a Germany-based actor. The campaign shared content in German about the German government and politics.
  • We completed 9 YouTube channels and blocked 6 domains from the eligibility to appear on Google News Surfaces and discover as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Iran. The campaign shared content in Arabic and Farsi, which supported Iran’s government and Palestine and critically to Israel.
  • We completed 787 YouTube channels as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Azerbaijan. The campaign shared content in Azerbaijanic, which supported Azerbaijan and critical of Armenia and critics of the Azerbaijan Government.
  • We completed 1,707 YouTube channels and 1,736 blogs blogs and blocked 2 domains from justification to appear on Google News Surfaces and discover as part of our ongoing study of coordinated influence operations associated with PRC. The coordinated Inauthentic network uploaded content in Chinese and English about China and US foreign affairs. These findings are in line with our previous reports.

March

  • We completed 2 YouTube channels as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Russia. The campaign shared content in Polish that supported Russia and critically to Ukraine, the EU and the Polish government.
  • We completed 12 YouTube channels, 3 ad accounts and 1 blogger blog and blocked 4 domains from justification to appear on Google News Surfaces and discover as part of our study of coordinated influence operations related to Russia. The campaign shared content in Farsi, Italian, Kyrgyz, Russian and Spanish, which supported Russia and critically to Ukraine and the West.
  • We completed 12 YouTube channels as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Russia. The campaign shared content in French, German, Polish and Russian, which supported Russia and critically to Ukraine.
  • We blocked 1 domain from eligibility to appear on Google News Surfaces and discover as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Russia. The campaign shared content in English, French, German and Russian, which was critical of Ukraine and the West.
  • We blocked 1 domain from eligibility to appear on Google News Surfaces and discover as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Russia. The campaign was linked to the actor publicly tracked as Portal Kombat and shared content in Russian about German politics and German support for Ukraine.
  • We completed 63 YouTube channels as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Russia. The campaign was linked to Russian state -sponsored units and shared content in Russian who supported Russia and critically to Ukraine.
  • We completed 1,377 YouTube channels and blocked 1 domain from eligibility to appear on Google News Surfaces and discover as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Russia. The campaign was linked to a Russian consulting firm and shared content in Russian that supported Russia and critically to Ukraine and the West.
  • We completed 64 YouTube channels as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with a Romania-based actor. The campaign shared content in Romanian about the Romanian government and politics.
  • We completed 4 YouTube channels as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Romania-based actors. The campaign shared content in Romanian about the Romanian government and politics.
  • We completed 1 blogger blog and blocked 2 domains from eligibility to appear on Google News Surfaces and discover as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Israel. The campaign shared content in English that supported Israel.
  • We completed 542 YouTube channels as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Azerbaijan. The campaign shared content in Azerbaijanic, which supported Azerbaijan and critical of Armenia and critics of the Azerbaijan Government.
  • We completed 1 blogger blog and blocked 1 domain from the eligibility to appear on Google News Surfaces and discover as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with KOPP. The campaign shared content in English and Chinese that was critical of Tibet and the United States. We received prospects from Meta that supported us in this study.
  • We completed 2,472 YouTube channels and 1 blogger blog as part of our ongoing study of coordinated influence operations associated with China. The coordinated Inauthentic network uploaded content in Chinese and English about China and US foreign affairs. These findings are in line with our previous reports.

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