We strongly disagree with and will appeal the decision in the Ministry of Justice’s (DOJ) search mediation case:
- As the Court found, Google achieved its popularity and success through innovation: by building the best search engine and making smart investment and business decisions, such as our early investment in mobile. People don’t use Google because they have to – they use it because they want to.
- And what’s more, the landscape the Court assessed is very dynamic. Since the trial ended over a year ago, AI has already rapidly reshaped the industry with new entrants and new ways of finding information, making it even more competitive.
Why are we submitting a remedial proposal?
Before we file our appeal, the legal process requires the parties to outline which remedies will best respond to the Court’s decision in advance of a hearing on remedies in April 2025.
DOJ’s proposed remedy
For its part, the DOJ filed a proposal that reflected an interventionist agenda. Its proposal goes far beyond what the Court’s decision is actually about – our agreements with partners to distribute searches. If the DOJ believed that Google’s investment in Chrome, or our development of artificial intelligence, or the way we crawl the web or develop our algorithms, was anticompetitive at all, it could have brought these cases. It didn’t.
But the larger issue is that the DOJ’s proposal would harm American consumers and undermine America’s global technology leadership at a critical time—such as by requiring us to share people’s private searches with foreign and domestic rivals and limiting our ability to innovate and improve our products . .
Our suggestion for remedy
Today, we filed our own motion based on the factual findings in the Court’s decision. This was a decision on our search distribution contracts, so our proposed solutions target it.
You can read the full details in our archive, but here are the highlights:
- Browser agreements:
- Browser companies like Apple and Mozilla should continue to have the freedom to make deals with the search engine they think is best for their users. The court accepted that browser companies “occasionally evaluate Google’s search quality against its competitors and find Google’s superior.” And for companies like Mozilla, these contracts generate crucial revenue.
- Our proposal allows browsers to continue to offer Google Search to their users and to monetize this partnership. But it also gives them extra flexibility: It would allow for more default agreements across different platforms (eg a different default search engine for iPhones and iPads) and browser modes, plus the ability to change their default search provider at least every 12 months (the court’s decision specifically referred to a 12-month agreement as “presumptively reasonable” under antitrust law).
- Android contracts:
- Our proposal means that device manufacturers have additional flexibility to preload multiple search engines and preload any Google app independently of preloading Search or Chrome. Again, this will give our partners additional flexibility and our rivals like Microsoft more chances to bid for placement.
- Oversight and Compliance:
- Our proposal includes a robust mechanism to ensure we comply with the Court’s order without giving the government sweeping power over the design of your online experience.
We do not propose these changes lightly. They would cost our partners by regulating how they should go about choosing the best search engine for their clients. And they would impose burdensome restrictions and oversight on contracts that have reduced device prices and supported innovation in rival browsers, both of which have been good for consumers.
But we believe they fully address the court’s findings and do so without jeopardizing Americans’ privacy and security or harming America’s global technology leadership.
Important legal extracts from our filing
The remedies should match the alleged violations
- When (as here) a plaintiff seeks a remedy that exceeds the anticompetitive conduct found at trial, “the remedies must be of the ‘same type or class’ as the offences.” Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1460 (cit Zenith Radio, 395 US at 132-33); New York224 F. Supp. 2d at 136.
- “In particular, when plaintiffs request structural relief, they must provide ‘a clearer indication of a substantial causal connection between conduct and the creation or maintenance of market power.’ Massachusetts373 F.3d at 1230 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). “Absent such causation, the antitrust defendant’s unlawful conduct should be remedied by an injunction to continue that conduct.” Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 106.”
Extreme measures are not recommended
- “[A] a finding of an antitrust violation does not authorize a court to initiate a general program of extensive inspection of the defendants’ business;.” United States v. National City Lines134 F. Supp. 350, 355 (ND ill. 1955).
- “Thus, “when it comes to relief,” courts must take care to avoid decrees that “may end up impairing rather than enhancing competition,” and through detailed, court-imposed terms of trade make judges, who “should never aspire to the role,” “central planners.” Alston594 US at 102-03 (citing Trinko540 U.S. at 408, 415).”
- “The Supreme Court has shown that particular sensitivity to the prospect of “’continued oversight of a very detailed decree.'” Alston594 US at 102 (cit Trinko540 US at 415).”
“Caution is key”
- “Any stifling of technological innovation,” the D.C. Circuit has warned, “would be inconsistent with antitrust.” Id. at 158 (cit United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 948 (1998)). Accordingly”[w]when it comes to crafting an antitrust remedy, … caution is key, as “markets are often more efficient than the heavy hand of judicial power when it comes to improving consumer welfare.” NCAA vs. Alston594 US 69, 106 (2021).
- “The Supreme Court has shown particular sensitivity to the prospect of “‘continued oversight of a very detailed decree.’ Alston594 US at 102 (cit Trinko540 US at 415).
Discouraging investments
- “IN Verizon Communications Inc. w. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLPnoted (the Supreme Court) that “[c]getting companies to share the source of their benefits is in some tension with the underlying purpose of antitrust lawas it may reduce the incentive … to invest.”